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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
The issue relating to the finality of the default judgment in
favor of Akhavan for purposes of appeal is governed by Rule 60(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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INTRODUCTION
Akhavan has raised several new matters in his principal brief
which will be considered in the order presented.

At the outset,

however, it is important to note that the central focus of this
appeal is not whether the trial court was justified in exercising
personal jurisdiction over Roland Kaufmann, but whether Kaufmann
was unreasonably denied a fair opportunity to contest and rebut
Akhavan's one-sided testimony not only on jurisdiction, but on
liability and damages as well.

Brief of Appellant at 26-36.

outcome

in

of

the

trial

held

Kaufmann's

absence

The

vividly

demonstrates the degree to which he was prejudiced by the court's
denial of his motion for continuance. Brief of Appellant at 39-44.
ARGUMENT
I.

Motion for Continuance.
A.

Standard of Review

Akhavan mistakenly claims that Kaufmann has ignored the
standard of review on motions for continuance in this case. Brief
of Appellee at 11.

On the contrary, it is not the standard of

review, but its proper application that is involved.

The question

is what factors should be considered by a reviewing court to
determine whether a lower court has abused its discretion by acting
unreasonably under the circumstances.
Kaufmann respectfully submits that the relevant factors
to be considered on appellate review are to be drawn from the
particular facts and circumstances of the case itself.

See, e.g./

Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375, 1376 (Utah 1977); 17 Am. Jur.
2

2d

Continuance

§4

(1990).

In

this

instance,

one

of

the

circumstances not present in Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah
App. 1992) (relied upon by Akhavan) is the issue of personal
jurisdiction under the Utah long-arm statute.

Another is the

status of the appealing party as a foreign, nonresident defendant
(not plaintiff) residing thousands of miles from the forum. Others
include the obvious breakdown of the attorney-client relationship
shortly before trial, together with Kaufmannfs attempts to remedy
the situation as best he could.
at 33-36.

See generally, Brief of Appellant

In short, this is not a case in which the moving party

lived across the street from the courthouse.

Kaufmann should not

be disadvantaged by the mechanical application of a single Utah
case

which

is

so

different

from

the

particular

facts

and

circumstances of his own.
B.

Reguest for Evidentiary Hearing

Akhavan further claims that Kaufmann should be precluded
from raising the issue of his due process right to an evidentiary
hearing on appeal because he failed to reguest such a hearing
below.

Brief of Appellee at 3.

Such a claim ignores the clear

statement on pre-trial procedure by the Utah Supreme Court in these
cases:
When jurisdiction turns on the same facts as the
merits of the case, an evidentiary hearing is
inappropriate because it infringes on the right to
a jury trial and is an inefficient use of judicial
resources (hearing the same evidence twice); in
such cases—if the plaintiff has made a prima facie
showing—jurisdiction is determined by trial on the
merits.

3

Anderson

v.

American

Surgeons, 807 P.2d

Society

825, 827

of
(Utah

Plastic
1990),

and

Reconstructive

cited in Brief of

Appellant at 29-31.
Kaufmann's due process right to an evidentiary hearing is
clearly relevant as one of the factors involved in his motion for
continuance.

The issue was raised several times below and never

waived by stipulation or otherwise.
28-31; 39-41.

Brief of Appellant at 17-18;

Since jurisdiction turns on the same facts as the

merits of this case, the issue was properly reserved until trial.
II.

Default Judgment.
Akhavan claims that Kaufmann is barred from appealing the

default judgment entered against him because he failed to file a
post-trial motion to set it aside under Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Brief of Appellee at 14-15.

This

statement of the law governing finality of default judgments is
erroneous•
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule
59(b);
(3) fraud
(whether
heretofore
denominated
intrinsic
or
extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an
action has not been personally served upon the
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5)
the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been
4

satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable
that
the
judgment
should
have
prospective
application; or (7) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment.
The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and
for reasons (1), (2), (3), and (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision
(b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation.
This rule does not limit
the power of a court to entertain an independent
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent
action.
(Emphasis added.)
As the plain wording of the text indicates, a Rule 60(b)
motion is properly taken from a final judgment and does not affect
the finality of the judgment itself for purposes of appeal.

The

rationale is based upon the extended time periods applicable to
such motions.

7 Moore's Federal Practice H60.29 (1993).

In this connection, the parallel federal rule has been
analyzed as follows:
An application for relief from a judgment
under Rule 60(b) also does not extend the time for
taking an appeal.
Even if the court hears and
denies the motion before the appeal time would have
run, the appeal must be taken with the prior period
measured from the date of the judgment, not from
denial of the motion.
If, however, the court
grants the motion and enters a new judgment, the
time for appeal will date from the entry of that
judgment.

11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §2871 (1973)
(footnotes omitted).

5

The same result has been reached in Utah, In Fackrell v.
Fackrell, 740 P. 2d 1318 (Utah 1987), for example, the Utah Supreme
Court flatly stated:

"A Rule 60(b) motion does not extend or toll

the thirty-day period in which appeals in the original action must
be taken."

Jd. at 1319.

And in Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v.

Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989), relied upon by Akhavan in
support

of

his

position, the

court's

consolidation of three appeals:

opinion

dealt

with

a

(1) Summary judgment dismissing

Schettler's counterclaim and third-party complaints; (2) Entry of
default

judgment

as

a

sanction

together

with

an

award

of

compensatory and punitive damages; and (3) Denial of motion to set
aside the foregoing default judgment under Rule 60(b).

Ici. at 953.

The court affirmed the trial court's rulings in all three appeals,
but vacated the awards of general and punitive damages in certain
respects and remanded for further proceedings below.

JEd. Rather

than treating the Rule 60(b) motion as a condition of appeal, the
court dealt with the underlying default

judgment as a final

judgment from which an appeal properly could be taken. Xd. at 961.
Akhavan has cited no case or other authority in support
of his position, other than those supporting the rule that a
default judgment may only be set aside at the trial level by a Rule
60(b) motion.

Such a motion is not a condition of appeal of the

original default judgment itself.
III. Finding of Fact on Jurisdiction.
Akhavan goes to great lengths to justify the court's
assertion of personal jurisdiction over Kaufmann in this case.
6

Brief of Appellee at 16-20. Nowhere in his brief, however, does he
address

Kaufmann's

conclusion

on

contention

personal

that

the

jurisdiction

court's

based

upon

finding
a

and

voluntary

stipulation of the parties is clearly erroneous. The indisputable
fact is that no such stipulation exists.
IV. Damages.
Akhavan wholly fails to address Kaufmann's contention
that the court's award of consequential damages in this case
constituted a double recovery contrary to law. Consequently, there
is no need to reply on this point.
CONCLUSION
Akhavan's assertions that Kaufmann is barred from raising
issues with respect to his due process right to an evidentiary
hearing and the court's entry of default judgment against him in
connection with this appeal are completely without merit.

The

judgment of the lower court should be reversed and the case
remanded for trial.
DATED this

9^

day of June, 1993.
Respectfully submitted,
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES

By:

G-^ J^°MA4
P a u l M. Durham,

Esq.

G. Richard Hill, Esq.
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 538-2424
Attorneys for Appellant
Roland Kaufmann
7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to be mailed, first-class
postage prepaid, to the following this

T^

day of June, 1993:

Richard D. Burbidge, Esq,
Douglas H. Holbrook, Esq.
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
139 East South Temple #2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

a -yi :JL « J <M in
grh\kaufmann.003

8

